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Chinese (Sino-Japanese) Buddhism in general and Chan (Zen) in particular are very
different kettles of fish from Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. The Daoist influence gives it a
whole new flavor. Chan certainly inherits a story about emptiness from Indian Buddhism, though. And though it may put a whole new spin on it, we take it that it pre-

serves the structural features about emptiness that generate dialetheias - though
substantiating this thought in detail is far too big an undertaking for this occasion.

In his article in this issue, Tanaka takes issue with our view that Dogen's Buddhism is dialetheic. In a paper rich in textual exegesis and in philosophical insight,
he comments on four prima facie dialetheic passages in Dõgen. The first two we
ourselves cited in connection with the claim that Dõgen is dialetheic.1 Tanaka argues
that the translations of the passages are not correct and that, appropriately translated,

the passages are not contradictory. Tanaka argues that the other two passages are not
dialetheic either. In particular, the word 'not' does not function in its usual way, but
is doing something else. The discussion of the fourth passage is combined with a

discussion of a fifth apparently dialetheic passage, which is used by Garfield and
Priest (2009) in connection with Dogen's account of the stages of enlightenment though it is not attributed to Dögen. Again, he argues that the negation should not be
understood in its usual familiar way.
In what follows, we will defend our translation of the two passages from Dõgen.
We will then discuss what Tanaka has to say about the third and fourth passages.
Here, we will largely be in agreement with him. Finally, we will discuss Dogen's account of enlightenment. This exposes a third important disagreement with Tanaka.
While we will agree with Tanaka that the passage cited is not dialetheic, we will
argue that he has misconstrued Dogen's account of the stages of enlightenment - or
our account of this - and is simply looking for dialetheism in the wrong place.
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Dogen, Passage 1
The first passage we cite is from the Shõji, which we took from a standard translation,2 and it goes as follows:
Just understand that birth-and-death is itself nirvana. There is nothing such as birth and

death to be avoided. There is nothing such as nirvana to be sought. Only when you realize
this are you free from birth and death.

The prima facie dialetheia is obvious. The passage implies that there is such a thing
as birth and death, and denies it. Tanaka's translation of the passage is:
Only when you regard [literally, have in mind] birth-and-death just as nirvāna and you do

not avoid it as birth-and-death and you don't seek it as nirvāna, are you free from birthand-death.

This does not appear dialetheic. In particular, the passage mentions neither the existence nor the non-existence of birth-and-death, and therefore does not assert the

contradiction that birth-and-death exists and doesn't exist. Rather, Tanaka argues,
Dõgen merely urges us to refrain from such cognitive (or intentional) states as avoidance and seeking of birth-and-death.
Tanaka's claim is untenable for two reasons. The first is rather straightforward: his

translation of the passage is incorrect, both on lexical and grammatical grounds. The
second is philosophical: Dõgen had a good reason to talk not merely about cognitive
attitudes toward birth-and-death but also about its existence and non-existence. We
first consider the interpretation of the Shõji on purely philological terms, and then
turn to philosophical issues.
First of all, Tanaka's translation is lexically incorrect. He does not translate the

Japanese auxiliary verb beki that appears in the passage and which means 'have
to' in that context. So his translation must be modified to read 'you don't have to
avoid it as birth-and-death and you don't have to seek it as birth-and-death.' But the

negative form of the auxiliary verb is bekarazu T or bekaraji D, neither of which actually occurs in the text, rather than bekimonaku && < or bekimonashi x' # íj % L , which are to be found in the text.
But things get worse. Even if we follow Tanaka in being so unfaithful to the text
as to omit the auxiliary verb, his reading cannot be sustained. The negative forms of

itou L ï ¿ 9 , to avoid, and negau tìffò , to seek, are itowazu and negawazu respectively. Again we cannot find these expressions in the phrase at
issue, and without them, Tanaka's reading cannot be sustained.

Indeed there are words for negation in the passage: naku & < and nashi ?£ L.
But what is negated is neither 'have to avoid' (seek) nor 'to avoid' (seek). What is
negated? The answer becomes obvious when we attend to the grammatical fact that

mo is commonly used as an abbreviation of monowa CO ti or the phrase best
translated as 'thing which is.' The unabbreviated version of this key phrase would
then be itou-beki-monowa-naku, and this can be straightforwardly translated as 'a
thing to be avoided is not,' 'a thing to be avoided doesn't exist,' or 'there is nothing
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to be avoided/ It is then absolutely clear that what is negated is the existence of the
object of these cognitive states, that is, birth-and-death, and not the advisability of
entering these cognitive states.
We grant that translation is always underdetermined. And of course we grant that

it is often not an easy task to translate Dôgen's language into English. But the passage

at issue is rather straightforward. Tanaka's translation is not a possible reading, but

rather an obvious mistranslation. Dõgen literally asserts the existence and nonexistence of life-and-death in the passage, and what he asserts is literally contradictory.3

So much for philology. We now turn to the second reason for rejecting Tanaka's
effort to make this text consistent, a philosophical reason. The Shõji (Birth-and-death)
chapter opens with two quotations of ancient Zen/Chan masters, Kassan and Jõzan.
Both of these sentences, or K-J sentences as we call them, refer to birth-and-death:
(1)

limatili * L

If there is Buddha in birth-and-death, there is no birth-and-dea
(2)

It is also said that if there is no Buddha in birth-and-death, one is not perplexed by birthand-death.

Dõgen comments on the K-J sentences as follows:
As being words of persons who obtained nirvana, these must not be put aside in vain. So

anyone who wants to be free from birth-and-death should make clear the meaning of

these sentences.

The whole Shõji chapter constitutes Dôgen's interpretation of, or response to, the

K-J sentences. The passage we quoted is thus naturally read as Dogen's interpretation

of the K-J sentences. Dogen's second sentence, "there is nothing such as birth and
death to be avoided/' reflects the non-existence of birth-and-death implied by the
consequent of (1), while his third sentence, "there is nothing such as nirvana to
be sought," reaffirms the non-existence of Buddha mentioned in the antecedent of
(2).

There is no other passage in the Shõji that explicitly refers to the existence and/

or non-existence of birth-and-death. So, in addition to being philologically unsound,

Tanaka's translation of the passage at issue has an unhappy interpretative consequence: On his reading, Dõgen does not take into account Kassan's and Jozan's
remarks about the existence or non-existence of birth-and-death, despite the fact that
this chapter is structured as a commentary on them.

Of course, Dõgen is well known for taking Chinese passages and bending them.
But there is absolutely nothing in the Shoji that suggests that Dõgen is doing this
here. Quite the contrary. In the context of the short fascicle, the point of the passage

in question is clear, familiar, and is as follows. As Nāgārjuna says,4 samsāra (birth and
death) is nirvāna. Both, then, have no ultimate existence; both are empty, that is, have

only conventional existence. Only by realizing this may one form the appropriate
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(liberating) attitude toward samsāra (birth and death) and nirvāna. We are, then, talk-

ing about the existence and non-existence of birth-and-death.
Given this interpretation, it might be thought that Dôgen's contradiction, that
birth-and-death both exists and does not, can be interpreted consistently by parameterization: birth-and-death exists conventionally, and does not exist ultimately. But
even if one interprets the claim that birth-and-death does not exist as a claim about
ultimate reality, this does not remove contradiction. For Zen clearly inherits the idea
that ultimate reality, tathāta, Buddha nature, is ineffable. To say that nirvāna does not
exist ultimately is to say that nirvāna is not part of it, and so is to talk about the inef-

fable. So this attempt to avoid contradiction simply jumps out of the frying pan and
into the fire.5

Dõgen, Passage 2
Let us turn now to the second passage at issue. This is from the Cenjõkõan,b and we
gave it as follows (translation from the same source as the previous quotation):
As (jisetsu) a'' things are Buddha-dharma, there is delusion and realization, practice, birth
and death, and there are Buddhas and sentient beings. As (jisetsu) the myriad things are

without an abiding self, there is no delusion, no realization, no Buddha, no sentient beings, no birth and death.

Dõgen clearly seems to be saying that delusion, realization, et cetera both exist and
do not exist. Tanaka contests the translation. The Japanese is:

< < «fc b -

The key word in the dispute is jisetsu fêSp. The word

Tanaka suggests that this defuses the contradiction, since w
at a time when A, B; at a time when C, ->B.

But this defuses the contradiction only if the times are differ

not the case. The contents of both of the jisetu clauses are
and not in a temporally restricted form, by Madhayama
Dõgen in particular: all things are Buddha-dharma and the m
an abiding self. (And, in this case, we cannot even hope to
by saying that one is a conventional truth and the other is an

the same status.)

We note that unlike when in English, the Japanese wor
categorical, rather than a temporally restricted, assertion
often uses it in this way, for example in such chapters of

ouju,8 and Uji.9 In other words, the contradictories are no
ticular occasion or time. There is still, then, a contradiction
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Tanaka notes this possibility. In reply, he contests the translation of the passage
"as (jisetsu) the myriad things are without an abiding self/'10 According to Tanaka,
this should be "[w]hen I am present together with myriad things/' Several points are
relevant here. The first is that the translation is just wrong. Tanaka has mysteriously
dropped the word for negation in the original text, zaru.u
Next, the context of the passage makes it clear that the point being made is the
familiar one that if everything is empty (has no selfhood), then delusion, realization,
et cetera, have no ultimate existence - as the standard translation indicates. Finally,
and conclusively, this does not escape contradiction. Even if Tanaka's translation
were right, as Dõgen goes on to explain in the Genjõkõan , there are times when I am

together with the myriad things: in the enlightenment experience. Since the other
contradictory holds at all times, there are times when the contradiction is realized.
Tanaka says that the two sentences we have just discussed are part of a triplet in
their Genjõkõan context, and suggests a connection between the triplet and the three
stages of awakening. For the record, there are two further sentences, which are:
Because the Buddha Way originally sprang forth from abundance and paucity, there is
birth and death, delusion and enlightenment, sentient beings and Buddhas. Moreover,
though this is so, flowers fall when we cling to them, and weeds only grow when we dislike them.12

Whatever, exactly, these mean, the whole passage appears to us to have nothing to
do with the stages of awakening.
The Enlightenment Experience
We turn now briefly to the other two passages from Dõgen that Tanaka discusses. The

first of these concerns the enlightenment experience. He cites the following passage
from the Zazengi :
Sit diligently and then thinking (shiryo) becomes not-thinking (fushiryo). What is thinking
that becomes not-thinking, this is non-thinking (hishiryo). That is the art of zazen.

We do not see this as a dialetheic passage, so we do not need to contest what Tanaka
says here. But for the record, our understanding of the passage is as follows.

First, note that Japanese has three words that are used as negations: fu hi #,
and mu In the vernacular, these are virtually interchangeable. If they are used
differently, as writers in the Zen tradition sometimes do, they must indicate terms of
art. That is how Dõgen is using the first two here.

We take thinking in the passage in question to refer to deliberate rationalization
of some kind. In zazen, one gives this up. There is then not-thinking (fushiryo) going
on. But thoughts may still be occurring. The aim is to go beyond the experiencing of
any (subject/object) thoughts, non-thinking (hishiryo). It is the absence of any intentional thought. In the end, this interpretation is not so different from what Tanaka says

about the matter: the transcending of self is just a special case of the transcendence
of the subject/object distinction.
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We do have one significant disagreement with Tanaka here, though. He takes the
three shiryo to correspond to the three stages of Zen enlightenment. This seems to us

to be incorrect. The hishiryo state appears to correspond to the second stage of enlightenment. There is nothing here that corresponds to the third stage, as will become

clear in due course when we discuss the three stages of enlightenment.
We turn now to the fourth passage from Dõgen that Tanaka discusses. This is from

the Sansuikyo. Thomas Cleary's translation of the first two sentences is as follows:
An ancient Buddha said, Mountains are mountains, waters are water. This saying does not
say that "mountains" are mountains; it says that mountains are mountains.13

The second sentence of this would appear to be dialetheic. Tanaka defuses the contradiction by enforcing a distinction, as follows:
An ancient Buddha said, "Mountains mountain, waters water." These words don't say that
"mountains" are mountains, they say that mountains mountain.

This is a somewhat free interpretation of the text. In the original text (which, of course,

contains no quotation marks), the three phrases that repeat the word mountain are
exactly the same, except that the first uses the Chinese character for mountain twice,

the second uses the Japanese phrase for mountain twice, and the third uses one of
each. Normally, this would make no difference, and we would indeed have a contradiction on our hands.14 But in this context, it is natural to suppose that Dõgen intends

some kind of disambiguation, so we do not. But what this is, to put it mildly, is
opaque. Tanaka's gloss is not a standard one; but as to the correct gloss, we offer no
opinion. Neither, for our purposes, do we need to do so.
Post Enlightenment

This brings us, finally, to Tanaka's discussion of the three stages of enlightenment in
the context of the Ox-Herding Pictures and Garfield and Priest (2009). This discus-

sion starts with another quotation about mountains (not one from Dõgen):
Before I studied Zen, mountains were mountains, and water was water. After studying Zen

for some time, mountains were no longer mountains, and water was no longer water. But
now, after studying Zen longer, mountains are just mountains, and water is just water.

One might well think that we are in dialetheic territory with the second stage: mountains are no longer mountains; but we do not think so. The first sentence refers to the
pre-enlightenment stage. In this, one takes statements at their face value, having their

conventional truth-values. The second refers to the enlightenment stage, when all
claims are rejected. The third refers to the post-enlightenment stage, when we return
to where we started, but now things are seen in a different way.

The second phase of the process is modeled on what Garfield and Priest call
muification. This is where the standard truth values are mapped to e, by an operator
they call ¡j (mu). This signals a rejection of conventional truth values, and corresponds to something like hishiryo in the zazen experience. In the Sino-Japanese
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context, e (emptiness, š dnyata) is nothingness (te). And as Garfield and Priest say,
being mapped to e is a sort of external negation of the sentence involved (unlike the
internal negation of the object language). Taking that value is not to be thought of as
any kind of endorsement, though. It is a formal way of marking the fact that the claim

is to be rejected, just asTanaka says should be the case in this stage of the enlightenment journey.15 In particular, it is not an endorsement of a contradiction of any kind.

"Mountains are not mountains'' signals a rejection of all claims. In particular, mu (ju)
has nothing to do with mu (f&) as a negative particle in Japanese, and a fortiori the
contradictions involved in dialetheism. It is not even an object-language connective.
It is simply a map from truth values to e. Nor, contra Tanaka, do we take the couple
'Mountains are mountains and mountains are not mountains' to be true at any stage
of the process. /' fortiori , it is not a dialetheia.

At the end of his article, summarizing his main anti-dialetheic point, Tanaka
says:

The [story of the Ox-Herding Pictures] may well imply a contradiction. Yet, I have dem-

onstrated that Dõgen would not be so committed. For Dõgen, contradictions are to be
cast off altogether with the very mechanism that allows such contradictions to arise.
Dõgen was no dialetheist.

We agree that contradictions, and all other conceptual/linguistic constructions, are
to be cast off, as Tanaka says. But this is in the second stage of the enlightenment
journey: "muification" occurs, and all statements are rejected. But for us, this is not
where the dialetheias are to be found. They are to be found in the first and third
stages, where sentences take their standard truth values. And some of them take the
dialetheic value b, both true and false.

The satori/kenshõ experience may well be ineffable. But Dõgen, like all other
Zen writers, uses language. And he does this because the language tells us something
both true and important about reality. Dõgen is no Hamlet, for whom the rest is silence. As the goddess in the Vimalakīrtinirdeša Sūtra says, when she reproaches
Šāriputra for his silence:
All the syllables pronounced by the elders have the nature of liberation. Why? Liberation

is neither internal nor external, nor can it be apprehended apart from them. Likewise,
syllables are neither internal nor external, nor can they be apprehended anywhere else.
Therefore, reverend Sariputra, do not point to liberation by abandoning speech! Why? The
holy liberation is the equality of all things!16

And some of the things that Dõgen has to tell us about liberation are dialetheic. As to

what some of these things are, we stand by what we said in our original article.

Notes

We thank Kyoto University for support for the symposium on Contradictions in Bud-

dhism (2012) and the members of that symposium, especially Mark Siderits, Brook
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Ziporyn, Kojí Tanaka, andTakashi Yagisawa, and Shoryu Katsura for critical response.
We thank the Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences for its financial support for

the workshop. We also thank Constance Kassor and an audience at the American
Academy of Religion meeting in San Francisco for critical response to our work and
Tom Tillemans for his sustained critical engagement with our view. Jay Garfield and
Graham Priest also thank the Australian Research Council for support for this research. Thanks to Rebecca Alexander for editorial assistance.

1 - Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest 2008.
2 - Tanahashi 1985.

3 - We also note that Nishijima and Cross 1994-1999, vol. 4, p. 197, and Cleary
1 986, p. 1 22, translate the passage much the same way as we do.
4 - Mulamadhyamakakarikä XXV : 1 9.
5 - See our discussion of Argument 3 in our reply to Tillemans in this issue of Phi-

losophy East and West.

6 - Our original article gives the source as the Shõji. This is a mistake, as Tanaka
observes.

7 - We note that Nishijima and Cross (1 994-1 999) and Cleary (1 986) both use this
translation.

8-M(7)fêfp (jisetsu) IZŤZŽŽ&ŤZ &&&£.$> <9 ■■■ ŤZ. â & Ç> S S fêgff
(jisetsu) - 7ÎP& S4Í) * Whenever you get drunk [= are unenlightened], a close friend [= the Buddha] [secretly] gives you a gem [= Buddhahood].
Whenever you are [secretly] given a gem, you should always get drunk. (Dõgen

1993, p. 203)

9
(jisetsu)
(Z
>
^
££<{;£*>«< * AW ě * bžtůttttAR
k-fetlH) g-. . . ° In the case of an unenligh

Buddhism, all opinions, on the hearing of th
times become [acala with] three heads and ei
[Buddha who is] sixteen or eighteen feet [in]

10 - He connects this with a question of the me

irrelevant. The issue is what the jisetsu clauses m

gets to negation by introducing an irrelevant
Moreover, it is not even clear that when doe
car it did not break down en route. So when
didn't take it.)

11 - We note that Cleary (1986, p. 32), trans
things are all not self"; and Nishijima and

translate it as "When the myriad dharmas are

12 - Cleary 1986, p. 32.
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13 - Ibid., p. 99.
1 4 - We presume that Dõgen is referring to a Chinese text, where no such distinction

is possible, and the contradiction is bald. What this was, however, we do not
know. Nor, therefore, can we discuss whether the original Chinese was intended
as dialetheic.

1 5 - In the same way, in a contemporary formal logic of truth-value gaps, the mathe-

matics sometimes assigns gappy sentences a third value, n. But philosophically
this may be interpreted as an absence of all truth values.
1 6 - Translation from Thurman 1 976, p. 67.
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